A Brief History of Tomorrow by Jonathan Margolis
March 24th, 2008 by Nathan Shumate
Bloomsbury, 2000
276 pp.
ISBN 1-58234-108-7
Buy it from Amazon.com
or eBay or Half.com
This book suffers terribly from the unfulfilled expectations of the readers. Partly, that’s the fault of the publisher: the cover photo shows a man dressed in a decades-old conception of what “the future” would look like. Partly, though, those expectations come from the subtitle, “The Future, Past and Present,” over which one assumes that author Margolis would have had some control. (And by the way, can someone identify the uncredited cover image for me?)

The impression thus fostered is that this book will survey the erroneous futurology of the past — what former generations expected of the future, why, and why it (usually) turned out differently. That kind of overview of failed predictions would be fascinating, and it’s what I thought I was getting when I bought this book. Unfortunately, Margolis covers all of that area in a single introductory chapter.
The rest of the book is largely the run-of-the-mill futurology survey, looking from today forward. One chapter raises questions about the ultimate utility of futurological forecasting given the way in which history seems to surprise us as it happens, but leaves the subject without making much of a case for the necessity of the rest of the book. Ensuing chapters cover the standard subjects of prediction: environment (with some refreshingly healthy skepticism toward the doomsday cries of human-precipitated global warning), cryonics and other schemes of life extension, robotic and bionics, housing and employment, leisure, politics and society, and travel. Nothing Margolis explains should be utterly novel to a reader who’s been hearing about the future forever, although he does sometimes offer opposing views which are a refreshing change from the tone of inevitability which usually and without justification infuses forecasts of this kind.
The fact that politics and society occupy a discrete sixteen-page chapter highlights the major deficiency of Margolis’ aims, an era-specific one which shows just as much myopia in thinking about the future as any utopian vision from the early 19th century:
This is not to say that war will become obsolete, nipped in the bud wherever it threatens. But the late twentieth-century trend for conflict to be concentrated into isolated hotspots will, most experts concur, continue. “For the foreseeable future, a third world war seems unlikely; there is no major ideological fracture severe enough to sustain it,” says James Mayall, director or the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics. (p.214)
This book was published in 2000, the year before a certain confluence of airplanes and skyscrapers reminded the Western world that a forward-thinking mindset of progress is not an inevitability of history. Margolis gives some small lipservice to radical Islamicism alongside Christianity in this chapter, but he fails to realize the enormous, possibly overwhelming influence which cultural forces have on the adoption and use of technology. Extrapolation of technology did not and could not have predicted the counter-culture movement of the 1960’s, or the crumbling of the Soviet Union, or any of the other social and cultural earthquakes which have shaped our present fully as much as the steady advance of the microchip. Ignoring or pigeonholing the influence of culture and instead envisioning a future shaped entirely by technological innovation leaves this and most other futurology books as quaint as artifacts of their time as the cartoons from the turn of the 20th century which portray rocketcars alongside women in full skirts and bonnets and men in bowlers and full moustaches.
The initial chapters thus remain the most insightful and informative, because it is only when noting the wrong directions of earlier predictions that Margolis really acknowledges the way in which the future seems to come out of left field. This book simply becomes one more cultural artifact, one more record of the blindered-thinking which seems to govern futurology in any decade.
Posted in Uncategorized | 7 Comments »

March 25th, 2008 at 1:38 am
“The future…difficult to see. Always emotions, the future.” — Yoda.
“Well, as long as they can think, we’ll have our problems…” –Eros.
“Predicting the future through logic alone, why, that’s just crazy talk!” — me.
March 27th, 2008 at 12:31 am
The picture is from the February 1, 1939 issue of Vogue
This website has what you thought the book should have been.
http://www.paleofuture.com/2008/01/bearded-men-of-21st-century-1939.html
March 27th, 2008 at 10:55 am
Excellent. Thank you, Martin. (Didn’t even realize that was supposed to be a beard — I thought it was a funky chinstrap for the helmet.)
March 29th, 2008 at 5:13 pm
Funny enough, I once planned a film festival devoted to “the future that never happened”. I wanted to show old movies set in what is now roughly the present, and do a “Prophecy or poop? You decide!” discussion after each movie. I mean, come on! It’s 2008, and Manhattan is STILL not a prison, STILL lacks flying cars, and STILL has not fallen (though technically, that could still happen until 2019).
April 6th, 2008 at 9:04 pm
And yet the quote about war being limited to a series of hotspots hasn’t actually been proved wrong, per se. “The Global War on Terror” is really more of an idea that links a series of conflicts and organizations, like “The Cold War”, and it is pretty hard to imagine a true full-scale, worldwide global conflict like WWII breaking out in the near future. That’s got nothing to do with culture and everything to do with logistics. To have a conflict of that kind, you need at least two roughly equal powers, at least one of which has both the means and the motive to capture the others’ territory. In a world of blatantly unequal powers, the larger power invading the smaller one becomes, well, Iraq, and a smaller one attacking the larger one becomes 9/11. Both of which are conflicts that steadfastly refuse to fit into the classic military paradigm, which is a big part of the problem.
So in that sense I don’t think Margolis is off base. We might go back to a more classic style of warfare at some point, but it would require a pretty massive shakeup of the current geopolitical situation, and thus, a fair amount of time.
April 7th, 2008 at 11:25 am
Hmm. I think it’s the part about “no major ideological fracture” is what renders Margolis off-base. I would interpret the “hot spots” idea to be like Darfur or Chechnya — truly localized conflicts, as opposed to the separate-but-related flare-ups stemming from a single “Islamicist vs. The West” ideological conflict.
April 15th, 2008 at 2:22 pm
Actually, were China to ever make good on its promise to invade Taiwan, I think we could see a return to old fashioned large scale warfare. Likewise should some tension set Russia and China against one another.
Barring those, it probably will be a series of small conflicts.
But I can’t help but imagine people in 1913 saying the same thing. “With all these alliances, it will probably just be a series of small Balkan state conflicts for the foreseeable future…”